

VZCZCXRO8341  
PP RUEHAG  
DE RUEHTC #0960/01 1181426  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
P 281426Z APR 06  
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5558  
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE  
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0148  
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1930  
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0185  
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 4012  
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 1662  
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0405  
RUEHWN/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN 1038  
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 0154  
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0061  
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2607  
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0612  
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0291  
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0258  
RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI 0050  
RUEHKG/AMEMBASSY KINGSTON 0379  
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 0135  
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0221  
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 0412  
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 0813  
RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA 0099  
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 0311  
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 0232  
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY MINSK 0128  
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 0263  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1657  
RUEHBH/AMEMBASSY NASSAU 0176  
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0530  
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 4933  
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 5042  
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 0264  
RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO 0281  
RUEHPU/AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE 0107  
RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN 0344  
RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 0201  
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0155  
RUEHDG/AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO 0174  
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1333  
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 0167  
RUEHTG/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA 0088  
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 2848  
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1702  
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0297  
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0035

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000960

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2011

TAGS: [PREL](#) [ETRD](#) [ETTC](#) [CU](#) [NL](#)

SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/CUBA: NSC DRECTED COUNTRY BY COUNTRY  
REVIEW REGARDING SUSPENSION OF TITLE III OF THE LIBERTAD ACT

REF: STATE 57782

Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew J. Schofer; reasons 1.4 (b) a  
nd (d).

11. (C) Summary: Dutch investments in Cuba are minimal, and post is aware of no bilateral trade agreements between the Cuban and Dutch governments. Post is aware of no exchange programs. The GONL is a leading advocate for human rights, and both the government and Dutch NGOs are active in promoting human rights and democracy in Cuba. Post is aware of no high level diplomatic visits between Cuba and The Netherlands in the past six months. End summary.

¶2. (C) The GONL considers questions related to implementation of the Libertad Act a European Union matter. It prefers to allow the EU to issue a common response to our questions. The GONL shares, however, our common interest in promoting democracy and human rights in Cuba. Moreover, The Netherlands has been extremely useful in promoting a more robust European Union engagement in Latin America and in breaking the Spanish stranglehold on EU policy in the region.

Dutch investment in Cuba minimal  
-----

¶3. (SBU) Dutch investment in Cuba remains minimal. Damex Shipyards, which operates a facility in Santiago (El Nispero Shipyard), is the largest Dutch business interest. The large Netherlands-based international bank, ING, which owned the Netherlands Caribbean Bank Cuba in Havana, has pulled out, leaving only a small representation office. UK-Dutch consumer products company Unilever also maintains a sales office.

¶4. (SBU) Post is not aware of any bilateral trade agreements between Cuba and The Netherlands.

Exchange programs: None  
-----

¶5. (SBU) Post is aware of no exchange programs between The

THE HAGUE 00000960 002 OF 002

Netherlands and Cuba.

Dutch actively promote democracy and human rights in Cuba  
-----

¶6. (C) The Netherlands actively promotes a common EU position in Cuba, with the long-term goal of democratic change. MFA Director of Western Hemisphere Affairs Marion Kappeyne van de Coppello has acknowledged that the EU policy of engagement has failed. In light of Castro's rumored ill health, she said that The Netherlands is now looking at ways to ensure a free and democratic post-Castro Cuba. She expressed a strong interest in being informed of our evolving contingency planning.

¶7. (C) The GONL adheres to the EU common position on Cuba out of principal, reflecting the Dutch belief that a unified strategy is the most effective foil to Castro's machinations and intrigues. The GONL has, however, taken an increasingly active role in Latin America and has moved closer to Czech positions on Cuba. The Dutch have served as a useful counter to more lenient Spanish influences within the EU.

¶8. (SBU) Several Dutch NGOs (or Dutch branches of NGOs) continue to focus public attention on human rights in Cuba, including Pax Christi, HIVOS, NOVIB and Cuba Futuro.

No high level diplomatic visits  
-----

¶9. (SBU) Post is not aware of any high level diplomatic visits between Cuba and The Netherlands in the past six months.

ARNALL